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CHALLENGING IMPROPER LAND USE




The Supreme Court has said that the Equal Protection Clause "is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike."' Equal protection jurisprudence has typically focused
on either a claim of disparate treatment based on the plaintiff's mem-
bership in a racial or religious group or other "suspect" class, or on
an allegedly irrational legislative classification. In its 2000 decision
in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,2 the Court acknowledged a dif-
ferent type of equal protection claim, one based on intentional dif-
ferences in the treatment of similarly situated individuals, and its
potential viability even where the plaintiff is the only party affected
by the disparate treatment.
The Olech case has relevance in the land use context because it
concerns differences in the treatment of individuals, and in fact deals
with an applicant's request for a connection to the public water sup-
ply. This paper looks at the Olech case and its subsequent interpreta-
tion in the lower courts. The decision was a mere five paragraphs
long, and seemingly very straightforward, but it has prompted varied
reactions and considerable disagreement in the lower courts. Addi-
tionally, this article addresses considerations relevant to bringing an
Olech type of equal protection claim on behalf of plaintiffs ag-
grieved by a local land use decision.
J.D. cum laude, Harvard Law School, 1988, M.C.P. Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, 1985, B.A. magna cum laude, Am-
herst College, 1983. Partner, Robinson & Cole LLP, Boston, Mas-
sachusetts.
1. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985).
2. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per cu-
riam).
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I. THE OLECH CASE
A. The Facts of the Olech Case
Grace Olech, a Chicago-area homeowner, wished to connect to the
public water supply after her well failed.3 When the Village of Wil-
lowbrook asked Mrs. Olech and her husband for a thirty-three foot
easement before it would make the connection, the Olechs balked.4
Previously, the Village had only required a fifteen foot easement for
water connections, and the Olechs thought it unfair that they would
have to dedicate a greater right of way. 5 Although the Village even-
tually relented, the change of heart came only after the onset of win-
ter, making it impossible to install the connection for several more
months. 6 While they waited, the Olechs were forced to obtain water
through a hose using a neighbor's water supply.7  Mrs. Olech
brought an action against the Village and several of its officials,
8
claiming damages for violation of her constitutional rights. She
alleged that the Village's action was "irrational and wholly arbi-
trary," and that the Village acted either with the intent to deprive her
of her rights or in reckless disregard of her rights.
9
B. The "Ill Will" Theory and the Esmail Decision
The District Court dismissed Olech's equal protection claim for
failing to state a cause of action. In so doing, it applied the standard
set forth in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals case Esmail v.
Macrane. 10
The Esmail case was brought by a liquor licensee whose license
renewal was denied on grounds that a state court ultimately found









10. 53 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995).
11. Id.
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he alleged not only that he had been treated differently from other
liquor license applicants, but also that the different treatment was
part of a "campaign of vengeance" by the mayor, who was also the
licensing official-an "orchestrated campai n of official harassment
directed against him out of sheer malice." 2 Esmail identified in-
stances where the police had harassed him and his employees, in-
cluding repeated police stops, field sobriety tests and the filing of
false criminal charges.' 3 The Seventh Circuit held that Esmail had
stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause and was entitled to
try to prove that the license denial was "a spiteful effort to 'get' him
for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective." 14
Following Esmail's lead, Olech had alleged that the Village's re-
quest for the wider easement was a result of the "substantial ill will"
caused by her previous successful negligence lawsuit against the
Village on an unrelated matter.' 5 Despite this allegation, the District
Court found that "nothing in Olech's complaint beyond conclusory
assertions indicated that Willowbrook was acting out of vindictive-
ness or in retaliation for Olech's prior lawsuit."'' 6
The Seventh Circuit disagreed. In the view of Judge Posner, who
also wrote the Esmail decision, Olech's complaint was sufficient to
state a claim under the "animus" or "ill will" theory of equal protec-
tion recognized by that Court.' 8 The Seventh Circuit noted its con-
cern with the "prospect of turning every squabble over municipal
services, of which there must be tens or even hundreds of thousands
every year, into a federal constitutional case." 19 But it also noted
that the "vindictive action" type of equal protection case "requires
proof that the cause of the differential treatment . . . was a totally
illegitimate animus towards the plaintiff by defendant." 20 A mere
"tincture of ill will" would not invalidate government action. 21
12. Id. at 178-79.
13. Id. at 179.
14. Id. at 180.
15. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 1998 WL 196455 at *2 (N.D.
El. 1998).
16. Olech, 1998 WL 196455, at *3.
17. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998).
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C. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Village petitioned for certiorari and the case was heard by the
U. S. Supreme Court.22 Although the Court upheld the Seventh Cir-
cuit, it did so without discussion of that court's "subjective ill will"
theory. Instead, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held
that Olech had stated a claim that could "fairly be construed as alleg-
ing that the Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement as a
condition of connecting her property to the municipal water supply
where the Village required only a 15-foot easement from other simi-
larly situated property owners," and also alleged "that the Village's
demand was 'irrational and wholly arbitrary' and that the Village
ultimately connected her property after receiving a clearly adequate
15-foot easement." 23 The Court concluded that "these allegations,
quite apart from the Village's subjective motivation, are sufficient to
state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis."
24
The Court, therefore, affirmed the Seventh Circuit's judgment with-
out reaching "the alternative theory of 'subjective ill will' relied on
by that court. 25
D. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
By contrast, Justice Breyer, in a concurrence, opined that allega-
tions of the Village's subjective motivation were the critical factor
allowing the Olech complaint to survive dismissal. In his view, the
presence of the "extra factor" of "'vindictive action,' 'illegitimate
animus,' or 'ill will"' in the complaint was required to give other-
wise routine zoning and other permitting decisions constitutional
significance. 26 As he observed, "zoning decisions . . . will often,
perhaps almost always, treat one landowner differently from another,
and one might claim that, when a city's zoning authority takes an
action that fails to conform to a city zoning regulation, it lacks a 'ra-
tional basis' for its action (at least if the regulation in question is rea-
sonably clear)." 27 In Justice Breyer's view, the presence of the
22. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 562 (2000).
23. Id. at 565.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 565.
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added factor of "ill will" in the Olech case was "sufficient to mini-
mize any concern about transforming run-of-the-mill zoning cases
into cases of constitutional right.",
28
II. CASE LAW FOLLOWING OLECH
Lending some support to Justice Breyer's concern about an in-
creased burden on the courts, over three hundred published federal
and state cases have cited to the Olech decision in the ensuing four
years.29 This is an average of more than one a week, although some
of these cites are not with reference to the viability or merits of a
"class of one" equal protection claim.30 These cases are by no
means all land use disputes. A significant number allege equal pro-
tection violations with respect to employment disputes, treatment of
prisoners, and the provision of public services such as police protec-
tion, among other matters. From a survey of sixty-six federal and
state cases reported in 2003 that cite to Olech in the "class of one"
equal protection context, twenty concern disputes over land use or
real property.
3 1
After Olech, not only are equal protection claims of the "class of
one" type more prevalent in the courts, but also it is now more likely
28. Id. at 566.
29. A search on Westlaw for cases citing Olech as of April 25,
2004, identified 320 cases.
30. Following the terminology used by the Supreme Court in
Olech, this paper refers to the type of claim based on disparate
treatment outside the protected class context as a "class of one"
claim, although such a claim need not be brought by only one plain-
tiff. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted that the Olech complaint was
brought on behalf of three neighbors as well as Mrs. Olech's late
husband, and could be read to allege a "class of five." The court
concluded, however, that "the number of individuals in a class is
immaterial for equal protection analysis." Olech, 528 U.S. at 564.
31. Based on the author's review of court decisions identified
through a Westlaw search for cases citing to Olech from January,
2003 through October 10, 2003, and excluding those that do not ad-
dress a "class of one" type equal protection claim.
2004]
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that they will survive beyond the pleadings stage.32 A recent article
found a nine percent success rate over a twenty-five year period for
equal protection plaintiffs whose rational basis claims were reviewed
by the Supreme Court, and hypothesized on that basis that "class of
one" equal protection claims should rarely be successful.3 3 It found,
however, that plaintiffs had prevailed in thirty-five percent of federal
district court decisions citing Olech and involving "class of one"
type claims. 34 A survey of more recent decisions found that federal
plaintiffs prevailed on their Olech type equal protection claims (gen-
erally by surviving motions to dismiss or for summary judgment)
twenty-four percent of the time.
35
A. The Standard for Pleading a "Class of One" Claim
A recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision addresses
pleading requirements for an Olech type claim and reinforces the
view that the standard for stating such a claim may be rather forgiv-
ing. In DeMuria v. Hawkes,36 the plaintiffs had sought police assis-tance in response to alleged harassment by their neighbor.37 Their
32. Dwight H. Merriam, Good and Evil in the Village of Willow-
brook: the Story of the Olech Case, 23 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 33
(May 2000) (suggesting that after Olech, "defendant local govern-
ments should save their energy for motions for summary judgment
and not try to dispense with such cases on the pleadings.").
33. Robert C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 78 WASH. L. REV. 367, 416 (2003).
34. Id. All but two of the cases in which plaintiffs "prevailed" on
their equal protection claim were denials of motions to dismiss or
motions for summary judgment. Id.
35. Of fifty-eight 2003 federal district and court of appeals cases
citing Olech reviewed by the author of this paper, fourteen allowed
the plaintiff's "class of one" based equal protection claim to go for-
ward. When claims brought by prisoners (which were uniformly
unsuccessful) are excluded, the rate increases to 29 percent. Land
use based equal protection claims brought to federal court had a 36
percent success rate (5 out of 14).
36. 328 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2003).
37. The underlying dispute was one of those "Hatfield v. McCoy"
type feuds between neighbors with which most real estate practitio-
ners are familiar. The row started with a dispute over surface water
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complaint alleged that in refusing to arrest the neighbor, Officer
Hawkes had treated the DeMurias differently than other citizens, but
the complaint "did not name any similarly situated individuals or
identify any differently-handled disputes."3 8 The trial court dis-
missed the complaint on the grounds that the allegations were not
specific enough to state a viable claim. 39 The Second Circuit re-
versed, holding that
the Olech opinion does not establish a requirement that a
plaintiff identify in her complaint actual instances where
others have been treated differently for the purposes of
equal protection. Indeed, it appears that Olech herself did
not "name names" in her complaint, but made the more
general allegation that similarly situated property owners
had been asked for a different easement. The Supreme
Court found that such an allegation could "fairly be con-
strued" as sufficient for stating an equal protection
claim.4 °
The Second Circuit also found that the plaintiff had alleged that the
disparate treatment was intentional. The Court found "these allega-
tions sufficient, albeit barely, to meet the minimal level established
by Olech for 'class of one' equal protection claims at the pleading
stage."4 1 However, the Court also acknowledged the heavy burden
that would be placed on the plaintiffs to prove their allegations as the
case proceeded.
flow and, according to the plaintiff, resulted in a year-long campaign
of harassment against them which included threats, attempts to have
their water turned off and trash removal stopped, offensive mailings
sent to their house, repeated harassing and threatening phone calls,
and an attempt to have their backyard excavated without their con-
sent. Id.
38. DeMuria, 328 F.3d at 705.
39. Id. at 704.
40. Id. at 707.
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also Nevel v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 297 F.3d 673, 682
(7th Cir. 2002) (finding that Plaintiffs' failure to point to any simi-
larly situated property owners who were treated more favorably than
they were, is fatal at summary judgment stage, and that it is not
enough to rely on government's failure to identify instances where it
treated others as it had the plaintiffs.).
2004]
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The Olech decision has surely raised the profile of these types of
claims and may have made it easier to get them into court. How-
ever, plaintiffs looking to prevail on these newly popular "class of
one" claims face a judiciary that, like Justice Breyer, is concerned
with the potential scope and frequency of such claims and anxious to
limit their effect.
B. "Ill Will" in "Class of One" Claims After Olech
One lingering issue after Olech is the role of "ill will" or "animus"
in equal protection claims.43 Reading the Supreme Court's decision
literally, it should be possible for a plaintiff to sustain an equal pro-
tection claim by proving, without more, that she was harmed by be-
ing intentionally treated differently from others who are similarly
situated, and that the disparate treatment had no rational basis. As
the Supreme Court stated, such claims may be viable "quite apart
from" the subjective motivation of the government actor.
Although a rational basis inquiry is already highly deferential to
the government decision-maker, some federal courts have been re-
luctant to acknowledge the viability of a "class of one" claim if the
plaintiff cannot also show that the government had an illegitimate
motive, such as discrimination, retaliation, "malicious intent" or
some other "bad faith" motivation. A line of cases, principally in the
Seventh and Second Circuits and their district courts, holds fast to
the notion that subjective bad faith is an essential component of a
"class of one" equal protection claim. The Fifth Circuit also seems
to endorse this approach, which serves to limit the impact of Olech,
and the case law in several other circuits remains muddled. For this
reason, plaintiffs bringing "class of one" actions should be prepared
to plead and prove any facts that might show subjective "ill will" on
the part of the defendant.
In the Seventh and the Second Circuits particularly, courts have
struggled with the role of "ill will" in a "class of one" case. In a se-
ries of post-Olech decisions, including Hilton v. City of Wheeling,
44
43. For additional discussion of this subject see Michael S.
Giaimo, Ill Will and Class of One: Equal Protection Claims after the
Olech Decision, 55 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Feb. 2003, at 3.
44. 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1080
(2001); see also Purze v. Vill. of Winthrop Harbor, 286 F.3d 452
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the Seventh Circuit has maintained its pre-Olech requirement of a
showing of illegitimate animus as part of an equal protection claim
by a "class of one" plaintiff. Later Seventh Circuit decisions, how-
ever, seem to identify two distinct types of "class of one" equal pro-
tection claims.
In Nevel v. Village of Schaumburg, the owners of a designated his-
toric landmark house who had been refused permission to improve it
with vinyl siding pressed an equal protection claim.45 In upholding
the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants,
the Seventh Circuit separately considered theories that the plaintiff
was "(1) 'intentionally treated differently from others similarly situ-
ated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treat-
ment,' or (2) 'that the government is treating unequally those indi-
viduals who are prima facie identical in all relevant respects, and that
the cause of the differential treatment is a 'totally illegitimate animus
toward the plaintiff by the defendant.' 46
Although phrased in the disjunctive by the Nevel court, the second
test may in practical effect be merely a subset of the first, rather than
a separate basis for a "class of one" claim. The Nevel court goes on
to say that "under the second approach, if the government would
have taken the action anyway, the animus will not condemn the ac-
tion. III will must be the sole cause of the complained-of action." 47
It is difficult to see how this requirement will differ in most cases
from a requirement that there be no rational basis for the govern-
ment's decision-the crux of the first Nevel test.48 Indeed, when the
plaintiffs in Nevel pressed their claim under the second test they lost.
The court found that even if the "Board denied the Nevels' request in
order to punish them" it would not constitute a totally illegitimate
animus because the board also had a legitimate interest in upholding
(7th Cir. 2001); Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 275 F.3d 579 (7th Cir.
2001).
45. Nevel, 297 F.3d at 673.
46. Id. at 681 (citing Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927
(7th Cir. 2001)).
47. Id.
48. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
367 (2001) (stating that while biases "may often accompany irra-
tional (and therefore unconstitutional) discrimination, their presence
alone does not a constitutional violation make.").
2004]
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its rules and regulations49-in other words, the decision was ration-
ally based.5 ° In order to prevail on the second type of claim when it
would not have prevailed on the first, a Seventh Circuit plaintiff
would apparently need to prove that the action was taken for an il-
licit reason, and that the government would not in fact have taken the
action for any other reason, even if it would have been rational to do
so.
The Seventh Circuit has yet to disavow Hilton's formulation, and
some decisions of that court and the courts below it continue to
muddle the issue. 5' For example, the Northern District of Illinois
continues to quote from Hilton that, "to make out a prima facie
["class of one" equal protection] case, plaintiffs must present evi-
dence that the defendant deliberately sought to deprive [them] of the
equal protection of the laws for reasons of a ?ersonal nature unre-
lated to the duties of the defendant's position."
For its part, the Second Circuit has yet to acknowledge that Olech
changed the law of that jurisdiction. In a series of post-Olech deci-
sions, the court has managed to avoid squarely confronting the in-
consistency between its historic requirement that an equal protection
plaintiff show "impermissible considerations" such as a "bad faith
intent to injure a person," and the Supreme Court's holding that such
ill will is not a necessary element of the claim. 53 For example, in
Harlen Associates v. Village of Mineola, the Second Circuit held that
the plaintiff convenience store owner was unable to show either that
49. Nevel, 297 F.3d at 682.
50. But see N. Pacifica, LLC v. City of Pacifica, 274 F. Supp. 2d
1118, 1124 (2003) (citing similar Second Circuit formulation for
proposition that an allegation of an impermissible motive and of
animus is sufficient to establish an equal protection issue "in lieu of
irrationality").
51. See, e.g., Cady v. Vill. of McCook, 57 Fed. App. 261, 264
(2003) (citing Hilton for the proposition that Olech requires the
plaintiff to prove he was denied equal protection "for reasons of a
personal nature").
52. See, e.g., O'Sullivan v. City of Burbank, 2003 WL 22287349,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2003); Am. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of
Chi. v. Town of Cicero 2003 WL 1712561 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2003).
53. Harlen Assocs. v. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir.
2001) (citing La Trieste Rest. & Cabaret v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40
F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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there was no rational basis for the denial of its application for a spe-
cial use permit or that the denial was illicitly motivated, so that it did
not need to reach the issue of whether Olech had changed the Circuit
rule.54 Most recently, in DeMuria, the court once again left "for an-
other day" the decision "whether Olech removed our Circuit's re-
quirement that an illicit motivation be shown to establish a valid
equal protection violation." 55 As in the Seventh Circuit, this lack of
resolve and clarity has perpetuated confusion in the district courts.
56
The Fifth Circuit, too, has read Olech to require the plaintiff to
show an illicit subjective motivation on the part of the defendant in
order to prove an equal protection violation, even in the "class of
one" context. 57 In both Bryan v. City of Madison58 and Beeler v.
Rounsavall,59 the plaintiffs failed to allege an "improper motive" for
the defendants' actions, and the court thus characterized their claims
of procedural mistreatment in a permitting process as "selective en-
forcement," and denied relief under the equal protection clause. The
law in several other jurisdictions likewise appears to be in disarray
on this point.6°
54. Id.
55. DeMuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 2003).
56. See, e.g., Gavlak v. Town of Somers, 267 F. Supp. 2d 214,
225 (D. Conn., 2003) (finding that "Olech seems to have left open
the question of whether malice or bad faith must be shown to state a
valid "class of one" equal protection claim .... " and the Second Cir-
cuit has not resolved the question).
57. See Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 916 (5th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1052 (2001).
58. 213 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145
(2001).
59. 328 F.3d 813 (5th Cir. 2003).
60. See, e.g., Mimics, Inc. v. The Vill. of Angel Fire, 2003 WL
21990004 (D. N.M. Aug. 12, 2003) (citing Bartell v. Aurora Pub.
Schs., 263 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001), for proposition that a
"class of one" claim requires "a spiteful effort to 'get' plaintiff for
reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective"). Com-
pare Lakeside Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 2002 WL 31655250 (D.
Mass. Mar. 21, 2002) (holding that a claim failed because of its fail-
ure to plead facts tending to show that the board denied requested
subdivision waivers "for reasons of a personal or improper nature.")
with Envision Realty, LLC v. Henderson, 2001 WL 1505491 (D.
2004]
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C. The Role of Intent in "Class of One" Claims
After Olech, "class of one" plaintiffs should be prepared to show
not only that they have been discriminated against by a governmen-
tal defendant, but that the offending acts or omissions occurred with
the defendants' knowledge that they were applying different treat-
ment to similarly situated parties. Courts have tried to exclude gar-
den variety grievances about unequal treatment from the universe of
viable equal protection claims by adopting a constrained view of
when disparate treatment is "intentional.",6' They do so by constru-
ing the requirement that a plaintiff be "intentionally treated differ-
ently" to mean that the government actor must have meant to dis-
criminate, not simply that it must have meant to take the action that
resulted in the discrimination.
For example, in Indiana Land Company LLC v. City of Green-
wood,62 the plaintiff alleged that its equal protection rights were vio-
lated because its rezoning petition was rejected when the city council
invoked a local ordinance requiring a two-thirds vote rather than a
majority vote to reverse a recommendation of the planning commis-
sion. The plaintiff noted that a petitioner who was allegedly simi-
larly situated, had, three years previously, had a simple majority vote
applied to its petition.63 It was clear from the facts recited by the
court that after first proceeding with its customary majority vote,
which came out in the plaintiffs favor, the council had made a con-
scious and deliberate decision to invoke the two-thirds vote ordi-
nance.64 Indeed the council even went so far as to engage in a floor
debate as to whether the two-thirds vote ordinance was contrary to
state law, and ignored the city attorney's opinion that it was.
65
Nonetheless, the court refused to find discriminatory intent, speculat-
ing that the earlier council may not have been aware of the two-
thirds vote ordinance when it evaluated the earlier petition, and not-
ing that the plaintiff had not produced any evidence that any of the
Maine Nov. 28, 2001) (finding that allegations not claiming bad faith
motivation for discrimination in zoning matters were sufficient under
Olech to state a claim).
61. See Farrell, supra note 33, at 407-11.
62. 2003 WL 22208795 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 4, 2003).
63. Ind. Land Co., 2003 WL 22208795,. at *8.
64. Ind. Land Co., 2003 WL 22208795, at *4.
65. Ind. Land Co., 2003 WL 22208795, at *8.
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current city councilors had in fact been motivated by discriminatory
intent in applying the two-thirds vote requirement.
66
The summary judgment proceedings in the Olech case itself on
remand to the Northern District of Illinois provide another example
of this approach. 67 In denying the village's summary judgment mo-
tion, the court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the village had intentionally treated Olech differently from other
similarly situated property owners. Olech had identified other prop-
erty owners who were provided with village water without being
required to dedicate an easement. The village asserted that when it
installed water to these properties, it did not know that it had not
received an easement from the property owners, and therefore it did
not intend to treat Olech differently. The court held that this factual
dispute precluded summary judgment.68 Thus, the trier of fact would
have to determine whether the Village's disparate treatment of Olech
was intentional in the sense that it was done with knowledge that the
actions taken resulted in disparate treatment of similarly situated
parties.
On remand, Mrs. Olech's claim survived summary judgment.69
However, in many other cases, construing the term "intentionally" to
require proof of knowing discrimination will result in claimants be-
ing unable to survive summary judgment. By contrast, interpreting
"intentionally" as simply calling for a showing that the government
deliberately took the complained-of action with respect to the plain-
tiff (without regard to whether it was aware that it had treated others
more favorably), would result in many more claims surviving early
dismissal.
A still more rigorous gloss on the "intentionally" requirement calls
for the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted not merely with
knowledge of the disparate effect of its action, but in order purpose-
fully to discriminate against the plaintiff.70 Under such a standard,
the plaintiff would have to show that the defendant acted "because
of' and not just "in spite of' the adverse effects its actions had on the
66. Ind. Land Co., 2003 WL 22208795, at *8.
67. Olech v. Vill. of Willowbrook, 2002 WL 31317415 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 10, 2002); see also Farrell, supra note 33, at 410.
68. Olech, 2002 WL 31317415, at *16-17.
69. Oddly, this was only because the defendant raised a question
of fact.
70. Farrell, supra note 33, at 411.
20041
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plaintiff.7' Some courts have employed this approach in evaluating
"class of one" claims. 72 This standard would eliminate equal protec-
tion claims where the arbitrary conduct results from inattention or
accident.73 However, there appears to be little practical difference
between such a requirement and the type of subjective motivation or
"animus" requirement that the Supreme Court in Olech says is un-
necessary to sustain a claim.
D. The "Similarly Situated" Test
Whether the plaintiff will be able to identify parties who are simi-
larly situated and have been treated better is another critical element
in evaluating a "class of one" equal protection claim. This cause of
action does not protect against even the worst form of governmental
action unless there are others whom the plaintiff can point to who
have been treated better by the same defendant. It has been noted
that "[w]ithout an allegation that other persons similarly situated
were treated differently, the 'equal' portion of the Equal Protection
clause becomes meaningless."
74
Determinations as to similarity of situation are made on a highly
fact-specific, ad hoc basis. The Second Circuit has opined that the
question of whether the similarly situated prong is satisfied is ordi-
narily a question for the jury, although a court "can properly grant
summary judgment where it is clear that no reasonable jury could
find the similarly situated prong met.",75 Courts sometimes go to
great lengths to avoid finding that a party has identified others who
are similarly situated.76 This can be a problem for a plaintiff in a
land use case because someone looking to distinguish one piece of
71. Neaves v. City of San Diego, 70 Fed. App. 428, 430 (9th Cir.
2003) (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
279 (1979)).
72. Pariseau v. City of Brockton, 135 F. Supp. 2d 257 (D. Mass.
2001); McWaters v. Rick, 195 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Va. 2002),
rev'd., Mc Waters v. Cosby, 54 Fed. App. 379 (4th Cir. 2002).
73. See Farrell, supra note 33 at 411.
74. Econ. Opportunity Comm'n of Nassau County, Inc. v County
of Nassau, 106 F. Supp. 2d 433,441 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
75. See Harlen Assocs. v. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d
Cir. 2001).
76. See Farrell, supra note 33 at 411-15.
[VOL. XV
IMPROPER LAND USE DECISION-MAKING
property or proposed development from all others does not have to
work particularly hard to find ways to support that proposition. For
example, location, access to roadways, zoning district, topography,
size and previous use are among the myriad of factors that serve to
distinguish one parcel from another. Furthermore, in a permitting
context, the timing of the application may serve to distinguish one
otherwise similar applicant from another.
This proposition is illustrated by McDonald's Corp. v. City of Nor-
ton Shores, 7 which addressed an equal protection claim involving
the denial of site plan approval for a fast food restaurant because of
traffic concerns. The plaintiff put forward evidence showing that its
application was one of only three site plans denied by the planning
commission in the preceding five years, and that neither of the other
denials involved a restaurant. There was also evidence before the
court that there were nine other fast food restaurants with drive-
through windows in the city, including a few others located on the
same street, and that at about the same time as the plaintiff was de-
nied, a restaurant without a drive-through window was approved at
the site adjoining plaintiffs and another restaurant was later ap-
proved across the street.78 In dismissing the plaintiffs Olech based
equal protection claim, the court concluded that none of these suc-
cessful applicants were similarly situated, since the restaurants in
question either were not located on the same street, had obtained
their approval substantially before the plaintiff applied, or did not
have drive-through windows.
79
Another example is the aforementioned Indiana Land Company
case. 80 There the court agreed with the City that the plaintiff was not
similarly situated to an earlier applicant because the earlier applicant
was before a "different and previous" city council, which had the
guidance of a different city attorney. 8 1 Furthermore, the plaintiffs
and the earlier applicant's "procedural postures ...were slightly
different. ' 82 In the applicant's case, the city council voted 4-3 to
overturn a favorable recommendation by the plan commission, while
77. 102 F. Supp. 2d 431 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
78. Id. at 433-34.
79. Id at 438.
80. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
81. Indiana Land Co., 2003 WL 22208795, at *8.
82. Indiana Land Co., 2003 WL 22208795, at *8.
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in the earlier case the 4-3 vote was to reverse an unfavorable plan
commission recommendation.
83
The Olech Court's formulation of the "class of one" cause of ac-
tion says nothing about whether the plaintiff class needs to be inclu-
sive of all similarly situated parties who have been mistreated by the
defendant. However at least one district court has held that it is not
enough for the plaintiff to establish that it was treated worse than
others similarly situated. A plaintiff must also show that it was "sin-
gled out" in such a way that there are no other similarly situated
non-plaintiffs who were themselves treated the same or worse than
the plaintiff.84 That case involved allegations by public defenders
that the defendant county had been arbitrary and irrational with re-
spect to pay grades and promotions. The court held that plaintiffs
had failed to meet their burden to "prove that they were singled out
and that no one was similarly mistreated., 85 The court explained:
Defendants have arguably treated numerous Attorney Su-
pervisors as unfairly as it treated Plaintiffs and has simi-
larly paid these non-Plaintiffs less money than other At-
torney Supervisors. Proof that other, non-Plaintiff super-
visory attorneys are arguably mistreated by Defendants'
hiring and promotions system results in Plaintiffs' inabil-
ity to maintain an equal protection claim under the "class
of one" theory.
86
Under the logic of this theory, only the very worst treated among a
number of similarly situated plaintiffs would have a viable equal
protection claim.
E. Other Efforts to Confine Olech
At least one court has taken the remarkable view that the Olech
decision should be confined to the land use context. In Cain v. Ti-
gard-Tualatin School District 23J,87 the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Oregon held that:
The Supreme Court gave no indication that the holding
extended beyond matters involving municipal property
83. Indiana Land Co., 2003 WL 22208795, at *8.
84. Kozlowski v. Fry, 238 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1024 (N.D. Il. 2002).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 262 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1130 (D. Ore. 2003).
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disputes. The Supreme Court surely would have spoken
more clearly if it intended to extend the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to
every instance of arbitrary state action. Plaintiffs' wide-
ranging interpretation of Village of Willowbrook [Olech]
would grant relief to any public employee or student who
was "singled out" by a state official. Such a reading ex-
tends well beyond the limits of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
88
Nothing in the language or logic of Olech seems to support this nar-
row reading.
F. The Future of "Class of One" Equal Protection Claims in the
Land Use Permitting Context
A "class of one" equal protection claim remains an attractive legal
theory, given proper facts, for an aggrieved permit applicant or prop-
erty owner that believes it has been mistreated by the government.
This is true notwithstanding the significant hurdles that must be
cleared in order to prevail. Unlike typical permit appeal procedures,
but like other civil rights actions, the "class of one" equal protection
claim affords the prospect of recovering costs and damages for the
loss suffered as a result of the erroneous decision. Furthermore,
unlike a substantive due process claim, the equal protection cause of
action does not depend on the ability to establish a protected prop-
erty interest. Nor is such a claim subject to the extraordinary ripe-
ness requirements imposed upon regulatory taking claims. 89 Also,
unlike a regulatory taking plaintiff, the aggrieved permit applicant
proceeding on an equal protection theory need not be concerned with
whether it has been deprived of all or substantially all of its property.
Furthermore, the success of Mrs. Olech herself, and some other
plaintiffs, in surviving dismissal and summary judgment, should fos-
88. Id.
89. See Carpenteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Bar-
bara, 2003 WL 22176120 (Sept. 23, 2003) (finding that equal protec-
tion claims alleging mistreatment by the imposition of conditions on
and delay in receiving residential building permit and conditional
use permit for recreational polo field are separate claims distinct
from as-applied takings challenge and therefore may proceed, not-
withstanding Williamson County ripeness rules).
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ter the hopes of future claimants. Given the high financial stakes at
issue in land use permitting decisions, along with the inconsistent
and petty behavior that characterizes some local permitting boards
and officials, one would expect that the courts will continue to see a
steady flow of "class of one" equal protection actions in the land use
context.
